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Abstract 
 In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish 
expressives—utterances that express emotions and other affects—from descriptives, including 
those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of 
emotion and value (2), we show how these three features derive from the nature of affects, 
concentrating on emotions (3). We then spell out how theories of non-natural meaning and 
communication in the philosophy of language allow claims that expressives inherit their 
meaning from specificities of emotions—namely, from being felt, evaluative attitudes toward 
propositional or non-propositional contents (4). 
 
1. Expressives vs. descriptives: three benchmarks 
 Supposing that utterances (1)–(3) and (4)–(9) respectively refer to the same phenomena, 
compare groups A and B. 
 Group A: 
(1) Outrageous! 
(2) Ouch!!! 
(3) The frogs won it again! 
 Group B: 
(4) What the government did was wrong. 
(5) I feel outraged by what the government did. 
(6) This boiling oil has burned my hand and this is bad for me. 
(7) I feel a great pain. 
(8) The French won the World Cup again and I believe that the French are 
contemptible. 
(9) The French won the World Cup again and I feel contempt toward the French. 
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 Even if we take into account the fact that the utterances in B are about the same states 
of affairs as the ones in A, there still is an intuitive sense that they do not mean the same thing. 
The meaning of (1) is not exactly that of (4) or (5), the meaning of (2) cannot be reduced to the 
meaning of (6) or (7), and the meaning of (3) is somehow different from that of (8) and (9). The 
kind of meaning found in group A is usually called “expressive meaning” (the corresponding 
utterances “expressives”) and that in group B “descriptive meaning” (the utterances 
”descriptives”) (see Wharton 2016 for a review). Following this use, ‘expressive’ is restricted 
to being expressive of affects. 
 To start, observe that the distinction is not as sharp as we may initially think as there are 
clearly cases where the descriptive and the expressive seem to blend. Consider the beginning 
of Byron’s Darkness: 
 
 I had a dream, which was not all a dream.  
 The bright sun was extinguish'd, and the stars  
 Did wander darkling in the eternal space,  
 Rayless, and pathless, and the icy earth  
 Swung blind and blackening in the moonless air 
 
 These five verses do not fall neatly on the descriptive side—because they are so 
poetically evocative and aesthetically charged, and we can well imagine that Byron used them 
to express an affective experience. Nor do they fall neatly on the expressive side—they are a 
description of Byron’s dream or wandering imagination and, although embellished, it is 
probably not far from being a literal description. Sometimes, then, utterances fall in between 
paradigmatic expressives and descriptives. Also noteworthy in relation to these five verses is 
that it is entirely possible to find expressives which have the linguistic form of descriptives: 
i.e., utterances that are devoid of exclamation marks, swear words, or any other linguistic 
markers of expressives. We can even suppose that any linguistic item might, given a certain 
context, become an expressive. A sentence as vapid as “The boat has departed”, provided a 
tragic background, could mean “Alas, how regretful I feel!”. The distinction we are interested 
in then is not about the linguistic form (not the syntax, the lexicon, or even the prosody), but 
about what is meant by these utterances. As a consequence, although we will take these 
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sentences in group B to be descriptives and not expressives, the same string of words could 
very well be expressives provided certain background conditions or a particular way of 
pronouncing them (e.g., “What the government did was wrong” said in an overtly angry voice). 
 With these important caveats in mind, let us review three intuitive considerations—
which we shall discuss in more detail below—that we may think support the distinction. These 
will then serve as important benchmarks for our effort to account for the nature of expressives. 
(a) Hot vs. cold. Expressives always appear to convey affects (emotions, desires, moods, 
sentiments, pleasures, pains, whims, etc.), and that is not true of descriptives. Affects 
regroup a large class of psychological states whose main feature resides in the way 
they are felt—including positive or negative hedonic tones and various felt 
reverberations from changes in the body. In contrast, descriptives seem to simply 
convey beliefs or other doxastic attitudes that the speaker might have (supposition, 
conjecture, etc.) about how the world is. As such, and to use the usual metaphors in 
the area, descriptives seem to communicate mental states whose phenomenology—
i.e. the way they feel like—is ”cold” as opposed to the alleged “hotness” of affective 
states. So, while the meaning of (4)–(9) is tightly linked with affects, the type of 
meaning to which they belong—descriptive meaning—need not be. By contrast, 
there are no examples of expressive meaning which are completely detached from 
affects: expressives always involve affects which the utterer wishes to, or 
unintendedly does, communicate. 
 
(b) Fit vs. true. Truth and falsity are the normative standards by which descriptives are 
evaluated. This, however, does not seem to be the case for expressives. Compare, for 
instance, (2) and (7) while imagining that the person doesn’t feel pain. We would say 
of (7) that it is literally false, but not of (2). Similarly, whether we think it appropriate 
or not to use the word “frog” to express contempt toward the French as in (3), it 
seems independent of whether we take the sentence to be true or false. Of 
expressives, as well as of the affects they convey, it is more natural to say that they 
are (un)fitting, (in)appropriate, or (un)deserved than to say that they are true of false. 
This is in sharp contrast with descriptives and the doxastic attitudes they 




(c) Direct vs. indirect. While descriptives can and do sometimes convey affects, 
expressives’ distinctiveness is to do so directly. If one describes one’s affects, as in 
(4)–(9), one in fact communicates a thought one has about an affect, a thought that 
is typically hidden from the audience. When expressing an affect, however, as in (1)-
(3), it seems as though one directly shows the affect, or at least some of its 
components (e.g. facial, vocal, and gestural expressions, certain action tendencies, 
certain verbal behaviours) of which the audience might be directly aware. This 
arguably constitutes a communicative path that is more direct than the one going 
through a description referring to a doxastic attitude (i.e. a belief–like state) of the 
communicator (Foolen 2012). One way of putting this direct vs. indirect distinction 
is to say that in descriptives (4)–(9), one is told about an affect, while in expressives 
such as (1)–(3), one is shown an affect.  
  
 These intuitive considerations and others have convinced many linguists and 
philosophers that expressives and descriptives form two distinct categories of utterances (but 
not the only two). The same scholars, however, disagree on how exactly to account for the 
relevant dissimilarities and on how and whether the meaning they convey is different. For 
instance, some have argued that a distinct trait of expressives is that their meaning is non-
propositional and so cannot be analysed through ordinary truth-conditional semantics (Kaplan 
1999, Potts 2007, Blakemore 2011, Wharton 2016), while others have offered an analysis of 
the meaning of (terms usually considered as) expressives that only appeals to propositions 
(Schlenker 2007, Williamson 2009, Hom 2008). 
 This chapter unfolds in the following way: In Section 2, we present relevant insights 
from the main current theories of emotion and value. In Section 3, we explain how these features 
of affects are relevant in accounting for the properties that distinguish expressives from 
descriptives. In Section 4, we draw on familiar territory in the theory of language and 
pragmatics to explain why understanding the meaning of expressives requires understanding 
the affects that communicators express. In Section 5, we briefly suggest three ways of cashing 




2. Philosophical insights on emotions 
 Let us start by stressing something obvious about the three benchmarks we have just 
reviewed—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect. The distinction between 
expressives and descriptives seem to revolve around the existence of a privileged relation 
between expressives and affects. It is even tempting to think that the three benchmarks all derive 
from the nature of the affects that expressives aim at communicating. In this section, drawing 
on the recent philosophy of emotions and value, we show how thinking about the nature of 
emotions and cognates not only make sense of the intuitions we have started with, but promises 
to put constraints on the relation between language and emotion, and especially on what mental 
state an audience must recover when understanding the meaning of an expressive. Note that we 
use “affect” to refer to a broad class of psychological phenomena which includes emotions as 
well as affective dispositions (fear of height, arachnophobia, francophilia), moods (grumpy, 
elated, depressed), kinds of desires (cravings, horniness, perhaps hunger and thirst), or affective 
character traits (being generous, courageous, greedy). Even though expressives may convey 
any affect (e.g., certain slurs may express homophobia, which is an affective disposition), we 
focus on emotion. As the best studied affect, we hope that what we know of emotion will be 
central to understanding all other affects (see Prinz 2004: ch. 8 or Deonna and Teroni 2012: ch. 
9 for how emotions relate to other affects and help understanding them). Understanding 
expressives by understanding emotions thus seems to be a perfect starting point. 
According to the main current philosophical theories of emotions, the latter are 
psychological episodes, experiences in fact, that present aspects of the environment as having 
this or that significance or, as philosophers like to say, as having this or that evaluative property 
(see reviews by Deonna, Tappolet and Teroni 2018; Scarantino and de Sousa 2018). For 
example, in fear we experience something as relating to dangerousness (one evaluative 
property). In anger, we experience something as relating to offensiveness (another evaluative 
property). In amusement, we experience something as relating to funniness (yet another). This 
is why philosophers often claim that emotions are forms of evaluation and psychologists say 
that they are appraisals of a specific sort: they relate us to the various evaluative aspects of our 
environment given the various concerns we have while negotiating it. The fact that emotions 
are forms of evaluations is a recurring idea from Plato and Aristotle onwards (e.g., Rhetoric 
1378a20-23). More recently, the conception of emotions as evaluations has received extended 
philosophical treatments—we shall discuss the most important theories within this tradition 
below. In psychology, the same idea is developed, especially within the appraisal theory of 
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emotions (Arnold 1960). See in particular the concept of core relational themes (Lazarus 1991) 
or that of molar value of appraisals (Moors and Scherer 2013). The notion of evaluation or 
appraisal is also present in the other main psychological theories of emotion (which may use 
different terms for a similar concept): basic emotion theory (Ekman 1992) and psychological 
constructivism (Russell and Barrett 2015: ch. 8 and 13). 
Not every philosopher accepts that emotions are kinds of evaluations. In fact, 
predominant figures such as Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, James, and Ayer 
considered emotions as entirely non-cognitive attitudes: i.e., mental states (or mental events) 
that do not “say” anything about the world, that cannot supply any new knowledge, cannot be 
more or less fit to the environment, and are unable to preserve (or even fail to preserve) 
information about the world. For non-cognitivists, emotions are considered as essentially 
irrational (e.g. Kant 1798/2006) or arrational (e.g. James 1884, Ayer 1936, Searle 1983). These 
philosophers thus support the cliché opposition between reason and passion—Kant (1798) went 
as far as calling affects “an illness of the mind” because they “shut out the sovereignty of 
reason”. Today, philosophers such as Whiting (2011) and Shargel (2015) still claim that 
emotions are mere subjective feelings with no cognitive content. 
However, the arguments given by philosophers and cognitive psychologists since the 
1950s have convinced a sizable majority of philosophers that emotions involve a component 
whose goal is to gather and manage information from the world and the organism’s relation to 
it that is relevant to the organism’s well-being. This component of emotions, usually called 
“appraisal” or “evaluation”, is a cognitive component of emotion in the sense that its function 
is to improve the knowledge of the organism, to acquire and treat information, just like 
perception or memory (cognition comes from Latin cognoscere, ‘get to know’). Some have 
dubbed it “hot cognition” to contrast it to the “cold cognition” which excludes affects (memory, 
kinds of attention, problem solving, perception) (Brand 1985; Lodge & Taber 2005). Like other 
cognitive mechanisms, emotion’s evaluations can succeed or fail to perform their information-
processing function, which may allow or prevent organisms to react in an adapted way to the 
world. This cognitive function of emotion thus enables the organism to react effectively, much 
better than if it was deprived of emotions. As some philosophers like to put it, emotions thus 
help apprehend evaluative properties: i.e., get to know and manage those features of the world 
that have positive or negative value for the organism navigating in it. The widespread 
recognition of this cognitive component in emotion has made the stark opposition between 
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passion and reason obsolete. Emotions are now usually considered as (at least partially) rational 
phenomena. 
Even though emotions relate us to evaluative properties through cognitive mechanisms, 
it seems to be a mistake to think of the emotions as representing evaluative properties in the 
way in which doxastic states (beliefs, judgments, conjectures, etc.) represent properties. In other 
words, emotions are not mere feelings (as non-cognitivists claimed), but neither are they mere 
judgments—see Robert Solomon (1993) or Martha Nussbaum (2001) who, taking their lead 
from Stoic philosophers such as Seneca, have claimed that emotions are judgments, judgments 
that some evaluative properties are present in the relevant environment. Contrary to what this 
theory predicts, it has seemed to many that being afraid of x relates us to x’s dangerousness in 
a way that is quite different from the way in which a cold judgment that x is dangerous relates 
us to x’s dangerousness. (We will elaborate on this point later.) For various defences of the 
difference between judgments and emotions, see Greenspan (1988), Deigh (1994), Goldie 
(2000), Tappolet (2000, 2016), or Döring (2007). 
But then, if emotions are not evaluative judgments, how do emotions enable us to access 
information about evaluative properties? In particular, how can we articulate the difference in 
this respect between emotions, on the one hand, and doxastic states (beliefs, judgments, 
suppositions, conjectures, etc.) on the other? To answer these questions, we will now briefly 
present the most popular philosophical theories on emotions today. We won’t rely on any of 
the following theories in particular, but we will put aside the judgment theories (Solomon 1993, 
Nussbaum 2001) and the non-cognitive theories we have already mentioned (Whiting 2011, 
Shargel 2015; see also Hutto 2012) for reasons that will become clear. Anyway, these theories 
are not among the main contenders in philosophy of emotion today. For an in-depth review of 
philosophical theories on emotion see Scarantino and de Sousa (2018). 
One popular view today is the perceptual theory, which claims that emotions are 
perceptions of evaluative properties (see Tappollet 2000, 2016; Prinz 2004; Deonna 2006, and 
Döring 2007 for various versions). This theory was mainly developed in opposition to the idea 
that emotions are evaluative judgments: i.e., judgments that the object of the emotion possesses 
the relevant evaluative property. Perceptualists reject the judgment theory for three main 
reasons. 
First, because emotions, by contrast with evaluative judgments, do not necessitate a 
mastery of evaluative concepts: e.g., even if sadness is always an evaluation that one suffers an 
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irrevocable loss, one need not master the concept of “irrevocable loss” to be sad, but this is not 
true for the judgment that one suffers an irrevocable loss. That emotions can be nonconceptual 
allows accepting, on the one hand, that babies and cognitively unsophisticated animals can have 
emotions while, on the other hand, rejecting that they have the conceptual capacities required 
for evaluative judgments. And, we can observe in passing that a similar argument can be made 
against psychological constructivist theories such as that of Barrett (see Barrett and Russell: ch 
4), which requires one to possess concepts of emotions in order to undergo the corresponding 
emotion. 
Second, the capacity for emotions and judgments would be supported by different 
“parts” of the mind/brain, by different mental mechanisms. This would explain why we can, at 
the very same time, both judge that something is not dangerous (e.g. a horror movie or a 
rollercoaster ride) while still being afraid of it. If emotions were judgments, such a situation 
would require one to both judge that p (e.g. x is dangerous) and not-p (x is not dangerous) is 
the case at the same time, which would be highly irrational. However, it is not highly irrational 
to be afraid of a horror movie or of a roller-coaster ride while believing we are not in danger. 
The comparison with perception is made even stronger here when one thinks of phenomena 
such as the Müller-Lyer illusion where two lines of the exact same length are seen as having 
different lengths because of the chevrons that surround the lines (the figures resemble >––< and 
<––>). In such cases, we can be certain that the two lines have the same length, but we still 
perceive them as having different lengths and, again, this is not highly irrational. Because of 
such similarities, the horror movie and the roller-coaster ride cases have been called “emotional 
illusions”. 
Third, emotions, like perceptions, have a salient phenomenal character—i.e., they give 
rise to an intense subjective impression, a character which determines what it is like to be in 
these states. The way it is like to perceive, or to undergo an emotion strongly determines what 
these perceptions and emotions are. By contrast, it is not clear that judgments possess a 
phenomenal character at all, and if they do, it is very mild compared to that of perceptions and 
emotions and does not strongly determine what judgments are. What it is like to judge that the 
Swiss are wealthy, as a judgment, is not phenomenologically salient, contrary to hearing the 
distinctive sound of a bell or to being disgusted by rotten meat. 
Close cousins to the perceptual theory are what Scarantino and de Sousa (2018) call the 
“evaluative feeling theory” (Goldie 2000, Ratcliff 2005, Helm 2009, Kriegel 2014) and the 
“patterns of salience theory” (de Sousa 1987, Ben-Ze’ev 2000, Evans 2001, Elgin 2006). Like 
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the perceptual theory, these theories focus on the non-conceptual and phenomenologically 
salient nature of emotions as well as on how emotions can help us navigate the world by 
supplying precious information and/or a precious processing of information. 
Even though perceptual theories were mainly developed as a reaction against judgment 
theory, they resemble the latter in several aspects; in particular if, like most perceptual theorists, 
perception is understood in a traditional way which excludes the perception of action properties. 
First, although unlike judgements, perceptions are not literally true or false, they are 
nevertheless evaluable as more or less accurate, and this correctness condition usually depends 
on faithfully representing a stable, action-independent, external reality. Secondly, perceptions, 
like judgment, are typically considered as part of “cold cognition”. Thirdly, one striking 
resemblance that the perceptual theories as well as the evaluative feeling theory and the patterns 
of salience theory have with the judgment theory is that all of them focus on the knowledge-
acquisition functions of emotions—on how emotions gather and process information—rather 
than on their action-oriented functions—the roles they play with respect to orienting us and 
making us react to the world by inclining us to approach, get away from, try to destroy, or act 
in other ways toward their objects. 
The role that emotions play with respect to orienting us and making us react to the world 
comes out clearly if we think of the relevant evaluative experiences that emotions exemplify as 
various forms of felt engagements with the relevant aspects of the environment. This aspect of 
emotions is highlighted by action-oriented theories (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015; 
Scarantino 2014, 2015). According to them, emotions are felt, bodily, evaluative attitudes 
toward various contents (the latter may or may not be propositional). In other words, fear and 
anger are felt bodily attitudes subjects have toward the dangers and offenses that they encounter, 
attitudes that distinguish themselves notably through the specific bodily readiness they involve. 
At the phenomenological level—the way they feel like—these various states of bodily readiness 
are accompanied by pleasant or unpleasant hedonic tones and subtended by the feelings of 
various patterns of physiological changes (e.g., more sweat, changes in heartbeats, stopping of 
digestion) and motor reactions (e.g., the muscle contractions underlying facial, corporal, and 
vocal expression). This is how, in fear, we come to feel our body as mobilized to neutralize 
something; in anger, we come to feel a preparedness for a form of active hostility. According 
to this picture, feeling our bodies prepared or mobilized in these various ways constitute 
experiencing the evaluative attitude that the emotions are—this is the sense in which emotions 
are conscious evaluations, and it is markedly different from the kind of representation in place 
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in evaluative judgments. While emotions (e.g. feeling spiteful toward someone) and evaluative 
judgments or beliefs (judging that someone is contemptible) share many features, then—both 
relate us to evaluative properties—they do so in markedly different ways. 
Note however that if appraisal theorists such as Moors and Scherer (2013) or Lazarus 
(1991) are correct, we do somehow unconsciously, non-conceptually, and quite primitively 
represent something as dangerous when we are afraid. This is the sense of representing in which 
we categorize stimuli as dangerous when we are afraid, but this categorization is very different 
from conceptual, logical, or linguistic categorizations that philosophers have in mind when they 
say, e.g., that beliefs represent states of affairs. For a detailed defence that emotions represent 
evaluative properties unconsciously, see Bonard (2021a: ch. 9). 
Action-oriented theories, such as the motivational theory (Scarantino 2014, 2015) and 
the attitudinal theory (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015, see also Gert 2018), thus focus on 
how emotions relate to action tendencies, and can be considered as philosophical heirs to the 
psychological theory of Nico Frijda (1986), as well as McDougall’s (1923), Bull’s (1951) and 
Arnold’s (1960) emotion theories. Both the attitudinal and the motivational theories accept the 
three arguments given by perceptualists against judgmentalists mentioned above: that emotions 
can be nonconceptual, involve different mental mechanisms than judgments, and possess a 
strong phenomenology (although this is not necessary for Scarantino 2014). Yet, they further 
insist that emotions are also very different from perceptions. 
The most important difference is that emotions are chiefly characterized by their action 
tendencies and associated phenomenology, an ingredient perceptual theories are at great pains 
to capture (for more further important differences between emotion and perception, see Deonna 
and Teroni 2012). For example, in fear, we tend to avoid what we are afraid of; in anger, we 
tend to be aggressive; in joy, we feel like being proactive; in disgust, we tend to actively reject 
what is apprehended as disgusting; in surprise, we tend to enquire about what is surprising; in 
sadness, we feel prevented from interacting with a cared object. Emotions do not necessarily 
cause actions, as they allow responses that are relatively flexible, and so are different from 
automatic reflexes, like the gag or knee-jerk reflexes, as the latter make us react in ways which 
we cannot control. Nevertheless, emotions tend to make us act in certain ways, and the 
physiological changes that go with emotions prepare us to react in these ways. In fear, our blood 
circulates faster to better deploy our muscles so as to avoid what we are afraid of, and we have 
rushes of adrenalines which have many consequences that help an efficient response (e.g., 
digestion stops, which allows allocating more energy to avoiding what is feared). These action 
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tendencies and the physiological changes which subtend them make emotions very different 
from regular perception. 
Indeed, action tendencies are not necessary for seeing, hearing or touching, and the 
physiological changes subtending perception (e.g., firing of optical nerves, retraction of the 
pupil, activity in the visual cortex) are of a very different nature than those subtending the action 
tendencies of emotions (besides modifications in the central nervous system, emotions involve 
modifications in the sympathetic nervous system, in sweat, heartbeats, muscular activity, 
hormonal secretion, and more). Both the motivational and the attitudinal theory have insisted 
that emotions are essentially related to inclinations to act, and the latter theory has focused in 
particular on how the phenomenology characteristic of these felt inclinations contrasts with the 
presentational phenomenology advocated by perceptual theories. The difficulty for perceptual 
theories to capture the agential dimension of emotions and of the way they assimilate the link 
of emotions to value properties in presentational terms constitutes a major challenge for these 
theories. As we will see in the next section, different emotion theories may be used to cash out 
the benchmarks with which we started (hotness, fitness, and directedness), but to anticipate a 
little, let us already note that, on the face of it, the action-oriented theories appear to be in the 
best position to do so. 
Note however that if emotions are considered as perception of calls for action (as in 
Deonna 2006), perceptions of affordances (Gibson 1977), or of action properties (Nanay 2013), 
then perception and emotion can be considered to be much more similar than with a more 
traditional theory of perception. Nevertheless, some of the differences discussed in Deonna and 
Teroni (2014) remain. Furthermore, the concept of perception in such theories is stretched to 
its limits and this is not what some of the most prominent perceptual theorists defend (Tappolet 
2000, 2016,  Döring 2007). However, see Prinz (2004) for a perceptual theory that is embodied 
and therefore more amenable to an action-oriented account. 
 
3. How the particularities of emotions subtend those of expressives 
 In this section, we show how the insights from the philosophical theories of emotions 
just presented shed light on the benchmarks with which we started (Section 1). Grounding 
expressives in emotions is, we believe, the best strategy to make sense of the distinctive nature 
of expressives compared to descriptives, and thus of how language can express, and not only 
describe, emotions. Indeed, we can start by observing that the three benchmarks distinguishing 
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expressives from descriptives—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect—
allow tracing back the relevant features of expressives to their emotional origins. 
 First, we can understand the “hotness” of emotions in light of their experiential 
dimension and contrast it to the experiential dimension of beliefs or other doxastic states. As 
we have just seen, emotions typically have a rich and diverse phenomenology, from valence to 
various dimensions of bodily arousal, via more or less urgent, empowering, and arousing 
tendencies to perform certain actions. The particular phenomenal character of emotions, the 
special way it is like to undergo them, certainly is an important part of what a speaker is 
communicating when using an expressive. 
 Second, the way we have described emotions promises to shed light on the specific 
normative standards or correctness conditions by which we assess emotions as opposed to 
beliefs, i.e., (in)appropriate, (un)fit, or (un)merited rather than true (false). This is especially 
salient if we conceive of emotions as forms of felt engagement or attitudes taken toward 
something or some state of affairs in the world, an engagement or attitude that is appropriate 
to have toward or merited by states of affairs instantiating the evaluative properties associated 
with each emotion. To someone who is afraid of a dog on a leash on the other side of the street, 
we shall say that her emotion is inappropriate to the circumstances or not merited by them 
because they are not dangerous. We will not say “Your emotion is false” (D’arms and Jacobson, 
2000). Our understanding of expressives then should reflect the fact that part of what is 
recovered is not simply a way of representing truly or falsely how the world is evaluatively 
speaking—as in doxastic attitudes and descriptives—but an engagement with the world that we 
conceive of as more or less appropriate. Beliefs fulfil their function (they are correct) when they 
are true; emotions fulfil their function (and, as philosophers of emotion say, they are “correct”) 
when appropriate, fitting or merited. 
Note that the idea that emotions fit their object or that objects merit or deserve emotional 
response in the sense intended here has been the most prominent in the theory of value, 
particularly in the so-called fitting-attitude (FA) analysis of value. Various versions have been 
proposed in the last 130 years and they may differ quite importantly. Franz Brentano 
(1889/1969) is often seen as the father of this kind of approach and Ewing (1948, 1959) as one 
of its most notable advocates. See McDowell (1985) and Scanlon (1998) for recent and 
influential developments. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) provide historical 
background and present some variants of the FA analysis. Within this tradition and directly 
connecting to emotions, see D’arms and Jacobson (2000). See Bonard (2021b) for a review of 
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the different ways in which contemporary philosophical theories have claimed that emotions 
are evaluations and how these ways relate to the way emotions are viewed in affective sciences. 
Observe that in conceiving emotions as distinct forms of attitudes we have toward 
various contents, we make it clear how we can relate to evaluative properties without any need 
to consciously represent or judge that the world has these evaluative properties. Compare with 
the attitude of believing. While believing is that attitude that is correct to have toward contents 
(i.e. propositions) that are true, the subject need not consciously represent or judge the content 
as true in order to believe it. The relation to truth in belief is entirely accounted for in terms of 
the attitude that believing is. Now, the same can be said about the attitude of fearing. While fear 
is that attitude that is correct to have toward contents that are dangerous, the subject need not 
consciously represent or judge the content as dangerous in order to be afraid. The relation to 
danger in fear is entirely accounted for in terms of the psychological attitude that fearing is 
(Deonna and Teroni 2015).  In particular, as remarked above, one need not possess the concept 
of danger to be afraid just as one would not need to possess the concept of truth to have beliefs. 
This connects emotions with expressives in two ways: first, we can now envisage what 
it means for the speaker to be affectively rather than doxastically attuned to how the world is 
evaluatively speaking. Second, ascribing an attitude that is correct if there is danger (i.e., fear) 
is not at all the same as ascribing an attitude that is correct when the proposition that there is 
danger is true (i.e., belief or judgment). The felt, bodily, action-ready engagement we have 
highlighted makes emotions quite different from evaluative judgments and beliefs, even though 
they both are kinds of evaluations. 
We must keep this in mind when studying expressives because this difference in the 
kind of evaluation involved sharply sets expressives apart from descriptives, such as (4) and (5) 
or (8) and (9), which communicate one’s evaluative judgments or beliefs rather than one’s 
emotions. Next, we can begin to see how the attitudinal dimension of emotion can be exploited 
to capture the sense in which the meaning of expressives might be non-propositional, in the 
sense that it is not merely made of concepts syntactically structured like affirmative sentences. 
Let us highlight that by “proposition” we thus mean something else than a mere set of possible 
worlds, as most philosophers writing on emotions do (see Crane 1992 or Camp 2018 for this 
notion of “non-propositional”). We can capture that by reflecting again on the correctness 
conditions of both types of attitudes. Belief is necessarily a propositional attitude, an attitude 
whose content has the form of a syntactically structured proposition and that is correct if and 
only if the proposition is true. Fear, however, as we have noticed, need not be a propositional 
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attitude. Fear of x (a snake, an exam, etc.) appears to be an objectual attitude, an attitude whose 
content is an object and that is correct if and only if x is dangerous. 
 Third, recall our third benchmark regarding expressives: they seem to mean by directly 
showing rather than indirectly saying. Our description of the emotions is such as to make it 
clear why they—as opposed to beliefs, for example—could be shown. If emotions are felt 
bodily attitudes toward aspects of the environment, then what is felt by the subject—i.e., her 
bodily attitude or posture—may be something an observer can also become directly aware of 
(Green 2007: ch. 1). The posture of an angry person, the action tendencies typical of sadness, 
or the facial or vocal expression of happiness are directly observable or hearable, and these 
observable/hearable expressions can be considered as proper components of emotions, along 
with physiological changes or appraisal processes (Moors and Scherer 2013). In the context of 
the understanding of expressives, we may then become interested in the kind of awareness of 
emotion that is required to count as someone understanding the relevant expressive.  
We can thus plainly see how the distinctive features of expressives we have 
highlighted—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect—seem to derive quite 
directly from distinctive features of emotions—their phenomenology, their correctness 
condition, and their nature as felt bodily attitudes. 
Although different emotion theories may be able to account for the way these three 
features of expressives are grounded in emotions, observe that at first sight action-oriented 
theories seem to be in the best position to do so. A quick comparison between action-like states 
and perception-like states—the two main contenders—in relation to our benchmarks will 
corroborate this verdict. Hotness: The feelings associated with action or action-readiness 
typically possess a bodily, dynamic, active, hot phenomenology that contrasts markedly with 
that of perception and its characteristic presentational, passive, or contemplative 
phenomenology, wherein the world appears to be made manifest to the subject. Fittingness: 
Being (un)fit, (un)merited, and (in)appropriate are typical standards with which we evaluate 
actions, but this is not so for perceptions, which are either accurate or not. Directness: Finally, 
actions, by contrast to perceptions, can be directly shown. 
In addition to the three features which we have discussed, let us observe that the 
philosophical theories that highlight the intimate relation that emotions have with action-
tendencies also explain a further trait typical of expressives, one which we have not previously 
discussed, but that is worth mentioning: expressives seem not only to be about the states of the 
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world and of the expresser, but also about how the addressee should react. As Dorit Bar-On 
(2017) puts it: 
Expressive communication, in general, is in a sense Janus-faced. It points inward, to the 
psychological state it expresses, at the same time as it points outward, toward the object 
or event at which the state is directed, as well as toward ensuing behaviors. (Bar-On 
2017: 304, our italics) 
If emotions not only have a cognitive function (i.e., gathering and processing information) but 
also an action-oriented function, as Deonna and Teroni (2012), Scarantino (2014), or Gert 
(2018) argue, then the nature of emotion nicely elucidates how expressives, by communicating 
action-oriented states, also have the function of pointing “toward ensuing behaviors” (by 
warning, asking for help, for retribution, etc.). 
We have tried to hone in on some crucial features of emotions so as to unearth some 
important aspects of what it takes to understand their occurrence in other people. In doing this, 
we have largely ignored the specific context of our question, namely that we are after an account 
of what it takes to understand the affect of someone trying to communicate this affect through 
an expressive utterance. The next section is dedicated to explaining the manner in which we 
conceive of the notion of expressive meaning in the light of (neo- or post-)Gricean pragmatics 
and speech act theory.  
  
4. Communicating through expressives 
In this section, we explain how the kind of meaning found in language (called “non-
natural meaning” by Grice) is fixed by the psychological states the speaker is intent on 
communicating. This philosophy of language framework will then allow us to show why 
expressive meaning is fixed by the affective states the speaker is intent on communicating, 
concentrating on emotions. 
 
4.1 Natural vs. non-natural meaning 
 To understand how philosophers have conceived of linguistic meaning since the 1950s, 
it is important to introduce the distinction between so-called natural and non-natural meaning 
(Grice 1957, a similar distinction can already be found in Marty 1875 and Welby 1903). This 
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distinction will then allow us to better explain the relation that expressive language has with 
emotions. 
Here are typical cases of natural meanings (which we write meaningN or meansN): 
(10) Smoke meansN fire. 
(11) The number of rings on this trunk meansN the tree was 123 years old. 
(12) His red cheeks meansN he is embarrassed. 
 Typical cases of non-natural meanings (which we write meaningNN or meansNN) are the 
following: 
(13) Those three rings on the bell meanNN that the bus is full. 
(14) By saying “And the dishes...” Joe meantNN that Sam should do the dishes.  
(15) “La neige est blanche” meansNN “Snow is white”. 
 As Fred Dretske (1986, 2008) has argued, we can interpret Grice’s natural meaning 
along the following lines: natural signs are indicators; what they meanN is what they indicate to 
be so. They can do this thanks to certain lawful (including biological) relations, objective 
constraints, or probable association between the sign and what constitutes their meaningN. For 
instance, the fact that there are 123 dark rings on a tree trunk can meanN the fact that the tree 
was 123 years old when it was cut thanks to the lawful constraint that, every year, winter is 
colder than summer, which affects the tree growth and create these dark rings. Example (12) 
above possesses both expressive and natural meaning: in this case, the red chicks are a natural 
sign for embarrassment because of lawful psycho-physiological relations between 
embarrassment and blushing (an uncontrollable cue). 
 Since we focus on language, and since linguistic meaning always belongs to non-natural 
meaning, we shall essentially focus on non-natural expressive meaning. But let us observe three 
things. First, natural expressives inherit their meaning from affective states: a facial expression 
of a monkey means that he or she is unhappy because there are lawful relations (or, at least, 
statistically strong correlations) between facial expressions and emotions (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 
1973).  
 Second, emotional non-natural meaning is typically based on, and makes use of, 
expressive natural meaning, as Wharton (2009) rightly emphasized. For instance, “Ouch!” in 
English or “Aïe!” in French meanNN that their utterer is in pain partially because they are 
conventionalized forms of the initial natural meanings of uncontrollable vocal expression of 
pain (we can imagine a cry of pain resembling that of other primates). Similarly, if you ask me 
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“Should we go to this restaurant?” and I reply by sticking my tongue, frowning my eyebrows, 
and wrinkling my nose, I can thereby meanNN something like “No, I really don’t like the food 
there” because I have imitated a facial expression that meansN disgust in the first place. 
 Third, even in cases where there are no obvious links between natural meaning of affects 
and non-natural expressive meanings—for instance, when someone utters “Outrageous!”—
there still seems to be some ingredient of the non-linguistic natural meanings of affects that is 
preserved in the expressive signal. In this case, the fact that it is not a fully-fledged sentence, 
but only a one-word exclamation points to the fact that, when we are highly aroused by anger, 
we tend to utter short exclamations as opposed to lengthy and sophisticated signals. 
 Let us now turn to what is distinct about non-natural meaning in expressives. Unlike its 
natural counterpart, non-natural meaning doesn’t depend on lawful relations or statistical 
correlations between the signal and its meaning. It rather depends on the speaker’s overt 
intentions to communicate and to inform their audience about something. In (13), the sound of 
the bell means that the bus is full not because of a lawful relation, but because people have 
started using the bell with this intention. Similarly, the meaning of (14) can go through because 
Sam understands what Joe intends to meanNN. The non-natural meaning of a linguistic signal—
its message—comes from what the speaker overtly intends to communicate. 
 This is tightly linked to the thesis famously defended by Searle (1969, 1983) that 
François Recanati (1993) calls “the primacy of the psychological over the linguistic” and which 
will be important in the arguments that follow: it is primarily and primitively psychological 
states—beliefs, desires, emotions, perceptions, etc.—that possess intentionality, the capacity of 
being about something, of having a content. The fact that utterances can be about things in the 
world, that they can have meaningful content, is inherited from the intentionality of speaker’s 
psychological states. 
 
4.2 Expressive non-natural meaning  
 Now to the crucial step: non-natural meaning is expressive (as opposed to descriptive) 
when the psychological state that is overtly communicated, and from which the utterance 
inherits its meaning, is an affect, and most often it is an emotion that is so overtly 
communicated. In other words, linguistic meaning is inherited from a mental state (the primacy 
of the psychological over the linguistic), and in the case of expressives, the meaning in question 
is fixed by the conveyed affective state (emotions, moods, whims, urges, phobias, etc.). 
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 We can also spell this out within a Gricean framework of communication (understood 
broadly to include Grice 1989, “neo-Griceans” such as Horn 1984, 2004; Levinson 2000; or 
“post-Griceans” such as Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, 2015 or Wharton 2009). A central idea 
within this framework is that what one means by an utterance (often called the speaker 
meaning) should be cashed out in terms of a communicative intention that can be split between 
(at least) two sub-intentions: the sub-intention to make something manifest to the audience, and 
the sub-intention that the first sub-intention be publicly recognizable. If all goes well, the 
audience infers what was intended to be made manifest (the content of the first sub-intention) 
and that this was intended to become part of the public sphere, or more precisely to update the 
context between speakers and audience, the context being all the information and commitments 
that are mutually assumed in the context of the discourse (García-Carpintero 2015). So, if we 
focus now on, say, (2) (i.e., “Outrageous!”), the kind of utterance we are interested in, the 
Gricean framework predicts that the speaker, by producing this utterance, intends to make 
something manifest to the audience—her outrage (attitude) about what the government did 
(content of the attitude)—and she intends that this be publicly recognized. Once the audience 
has inferred what was intended to be made manifest (the outrage about what the government 
did) and that this was intended to update the context between audience and speaker, then the 
audience has understood what the speaker meant by (2). Another illustration, using (3) above 
(i.e., “The frogs won it again!”): the speaker has the intention to make it publicly recognizable 
that, by producing the word “frogs”, she intends to make manifest that she is disposed to feel 
contempt (attitude) toward the French (content). 
 You might have noticed that we are cautious to disentangle the attitude and the content 
conveyed. This is because expressives and descriptives can inherit their meaning from 
psychological states that possess the same content: they differ only in the attitude they express. 
To illustrate the distinction, note that all of the following communicate different attitudes about 
the same content: “I judge that p”, “I’m happy that p”, “I desire that p”, “I intend to make it the 
case that p”. 
 Developing insights from Grice (1989) as well as Austin (1962), Strawson (1964), and 
Searle (1969, 1979), speech act theory offers the possibility of capturing further this distinction. 
An important hypothesis in speech act theory has it that we can distinguish types of 
illocutionary acts by types of psychological attitudes that speakers intend to communicate, even 
when these attitudes are about the same content. Illocutionary acts are the different things we 
do in using language: e.g., ask questions, describe an event, make a promise, insult someone, 
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declare our love, etc. Illocutionary acts are achieved when the audience understands to what 
end we use language. I achieve the illocutionary act of asking a question when my audience 
understands that I have used language to this end. 
 The idea that we can individuate illocutionary acts on the basis of the psychological 
attitudes they express has been methodically pursued by Bach and Harnish (1979): “Since 
illocutionary intents are fulfilled if the hearer recognizes the attitudes expressed by the speaker, 
types of illocutionary intents correspond to types of expressed attitudes” (Bach and Harnish 
1979: 39). For instance, according to them (and many other speech act theorists), assertions 
express beliefs about the world, orders express desires that the audience does something, 
promises express intentions to do something, and thanks express gratitude toward the 
audience’s deed, etc. Expressive meaning then, according to a plausible version of this view, is 
the meaning of utterances whose illocutionary intent is to express affects (e.g., thanks are 
expressives since their illocutionary intent is to express gratitude). The illocutionary intent of 
expressives would then be fulfilled when the speaker gets the hearer to recognize his or her 
intention to express the affect in question. By contrast, descriptive meaning would be the 
meaning of utterances whose illocutionary intent is to express doxastic states. 
Note that there exist multiple kinds of speech act theory beside that developed by Bach 
and Harnish and each of them may have something different to say about expressives. However 
we lack the space to spell this out (furthermore, expressives are often left aside by speech act 
theorists as they often concentrate on affirmations, orders, and questions). For a detailed 
introduction to the different kinds of speech act theory as well as preeminent examples of its 
recent developments, see Fogal et al. (2018). 
 The Gricean framework, together with speech act theory, is one way of cashing out the 
ideas presented here. Another one is to draw from biology and appeal to a signal model as it is 
developed in, e.g., Skyrms (2010). In particular, Green (2007, 2019) develops an account of 
self-expression within a broader account of animal signals which is very fruitful for analysing 
expressives, and especially perhaps emotional natural meaning and nonverbal emotion 
expression. All the claims presented here can be advantageously pursued within the latter 
framework. 
 This short review of the relevant philosophical literature on emotions and standard 
frameworks in the philosophy of language leads us to conclude the following: because the non-
natural meaning of an utterance (overall illocutionary act) is inherited from the overall 
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psychological state (attitude+content) the speaker is intent on communicating, what makes the 
non-natural meaning of an utterance an expressive utterance is the specificity of the affective 
state (attitude+content) the speaker is intent on communicating with this utterance. This is why 
a proper analysis of how language express emotions, of what expressives are, requires an in-
depth analysis of the nature of emotions and other affective states.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 We have begun this chapter by presenting what we considered to be three of the most 
salient features of expressives as opposed to descriptives. (a) Hot vs. Cold. Expressives inherit 
their meaning from mental states which are phenomenologically “hot”—the feelings of affects 
include positive or negative hedonic tones, various felt reverberations from changes in the body, 
and felt action tendencies. By contrast, descriptives inherit the coldness of the doxastic attitude 
they communicate. Think of the difference between someone stating “Someone has covered 
my car with graffiti” and the same person yelling “Shit!!!”. (b) Fit vs. True. Expressives can be 
assessed as more or less fit or appropriate, but we do not usually qualify them as literally true 
or false: a “Yuck!!!” would be deemed inappropriate if it were directed at a delicious dish, but 
it wouldn’t be qualified as literally false. (c) Direct vs. Indirect. Expressives can directly show 
the affects they express because they constitute part of their manifestation, belonging to the 
motor expression and/or action tendency components of affects. By contrast, even when 
descriptives are about affects, they indirectly report them. 
 We then explained how these three features of expressives—hot, (in)appropriate, 
direct—derive naturally from a picture of affects depicting them as felt bodily reactions to 
stimuli evaluated as relevant to the concerns of the person undergoing the affect. We have 
spelled out how both (neo- or post-)Gricean theories of communication as well as speech act 
theory can easily explain this matter of fact by considering expressives as utterances which 
inherit their meaning from the properties of both attitudes and contents of affects, noting that a 
signalling theory may advantageously analyse this out as well. 
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